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Abstract:  Although arguments for and against competing theories of vagueness often 
appeal to claims about the use of vague predicates by ordinary speakers, such claims are 
rarely tested. An exception is Bonini et al. (1999), who report empirical results on the use 
of  vague  predicates  by  Italian  speakers,  and  take  the  results  to  count  in  favor  of 
epistemicism. Yet several methodological difficulties mar their experiments; we outline 
these problems and devise revised experiments that do not show the same results. We 
then  describe  three  additional  empirical  studies  that  investigate  further  claims  in  the 
literature on vagueness: the hypothesis that speakers confuse 'P'  with 'definitely P', the 
relative persuasiveness of different formulations of the inductive premise of the Sorites, 
and the interaction of vague predicates with three different forms of negation.
0. Introduction
The phenomena of vagueness raise important and complex issues in the philosophy of 
language and of logic. One such phenomenon is the Sorites Paradox:
(1) Someone who is 2 m in height is tall.
(2) If someone x mm in height is tall then someone x - 1 mm in height is also tall.1
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1In classical logic (2) is logically equivalent to both
1
(3) Someone who is 1 m in height is tall.
(1) and (2) are, it seems, true, and (3) is false. Yet one can derive (3) from (1) and (2) 
using quantifier rules and the logical rule of inference known as Modus Ponens. Theories 
of  vagueness  aim  at,  among  other  things,  an  analysis  and  solution  to  this  paradox. 
Different theories of vagueness will generally do this in different ways. For instance, 
some  deny  that  (2)  is  true,  while  others  deny  that  the  rule  of  Modus  Ponens  is  an 
acceptable rule in the presence of vague predicates like 'is tall'. Although many theories 
of vagueness are committed to claims about the psychology of vague concepts or the 
actual use of vague language by ordinary speakers, philosophers of vagueness rarely test 
these claims  against  empirical  data.  For instance,  it  is  a standard part  of  defenses  of 
theories which deny the truth of (2) to give an explanation for why (2) seems intuitively 
plausible. Yet what is plausible to a philosopher of logic need not at all be plausible to 
ordinary speakers. 
The  recent  literature  in  so-called  experimental  philosophy  is  in  large  part 
dedicated to test claims of intuitive plausibility. Typically, this is done by comparing the 
intuitions of philosophers to those of the 'folk', where the 'folk' intuitions are obtained 
from some kind of empirical study. In this paper, we present the results of a series of such 
studies of the intuitions of ordinary English speakers about the use of vague language. 
We use our data to evaluate two such appeals to intuitive plausibility in the vagueness 
literature.  One is  the  hypothesis  that  ordinary  speakers  systematically  confuse  vague 
predications,  e.g.,  “John  is  tall”,  with  determinate  counterparts  of  the  form “John is 
definitely tall”. Generalized and restricted versions of the hypothesis have been given by 
(2') It is not the case both that someone x mm in height is tall and someone  x - 1 mm in height is 
not tall, and 
(2'') Either someone x mm is not tall or someone x-1 mm is.
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a variety of theorists.  For example,  Fine (1975) and Keefe (2000) defend a restricted 
version  of  the  hypothesis  in  support  of  a  supervaluationist  theory  of  vagueness.  The 
second example comes from a paper by Weatherson (2005). In support of his own theory 
and against the degree theory of vagueness, Weatherson claims that
(2’) It is not the case both that someone x mm in height is tall and someone x - 1 
mm in height is not tall.
is more persuasive to ordinary speakers than (2). (2') is equivalent to (2) in classical logic, 
and always equally or less true than (2) in fuzzy logic. We use empirical data to evaluate 
these claims in Sections 2 and 3. 
Some proponents of experimental methods in philosophy go further than using 
empirical  data to support or undermine claims regarding the ‘intuitive plausibility’  of 
specific  philosophical  claims,  and take  the  results  of  empirical  research  to  constitute 
evidence for or against philosophical theses. An early example of this approach is a paper 
by Bonini, Osherson, Viale, and Williamson (1999), which not only predates the recent 
resurgence of interest in experimental philosophy by several years, but is one of just a 
handful  of  papers  that  applies  empirical  methodology  to  philosophical  work  on 
vagueness.2 Bonini et al. elicited the judgments of Italian speakers to ascriptions of vague 
predicates to borderline cases. From the results obtained they ruled out the gap, glut and 
degree  theories  of  vagueness  as  not  supported  by  speakers’  actual  use  of  vague 
predicates, and found support for Williamson’s epistemic theory of vagueness.
2Early and very informal efforts are reported by Parikh (1991, 1994), who tests speaker disagreement about 
colour category boundaries and the assignment of fuzzy values to borderline cases. Hans Kamp ran an 
unpublished colour patch experiment in which he tried to find evidence of hysteresis (personal 
communication). Raffman (forthcoming) defends her theory of vagueness with empirical data showing a 
hysteresis effect in colour judgments. Alxatib and Pelletier (forthcoming) also use empirical methods to 
study vagueness; their work is described in later sections.
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A large  part  of  the  current  debate  about  philosophical  methodology  revolves 
around the question of whether empirical results of the sort presented by experimental 
philosophers have any role at all to play in philosophical investigations. Without lending 
support to either side of this debate, we would argue that if experimental research has a 
place in philosophical theorizing, it does so only insofar as the relevant experiments hold 
up to scrutiny. In particular, such experiments must be reproducible, the experimental 
designs  must  be  sound,  and  the  statistical  methods  used  in  their  analysis  must  be 
appropriate. In light of this, in Section 1 we criticize the methodology used by Bonini et 
al.  and  present  experimental  data  that  undermine  their  conclusions.  We  identified  a 
crucial ambiguity in their questionnaire. We then replicated their original study (using 
English  speakers)  and  compared  it  to  the  results  of  an  improved  version  of  the 
questionnaire. The results from our revised experiment differ greatly from those found in 
Bonini et al. (1999), and do not support their conclusions. 
We conclude by presenting data on speakers' use of negation in borderline cases. 
For reasons of space, we will not defend the use of empirical research in philosophy of 
language.  If  empirical  studies  have  philosophical  import  (as  we  think  they  do)  then 
empirical  studies  of  negation  will  be  an  important  component  of  such work.  This  is 
because  some theories  of  vagueness,  e.g.,  many-valued  and  truth-gap  theories,  leave 
room for different interpretations of negation. It is also an interesting question whether 
internal negation (e.g., “John is not tall”) and external negation (e.g., “It is not the case 
that  John is  tall”)  should be treated  differently  in  a  logic  of  vagueness,  and whether 
ordinary speakers treat such constructions differently may be taken by some to have a 
bearing on this question. Likewise, the treatment of negation by ordinary speakers might 
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be taken to favor one or another interpretation of negation. We describe an experiment 
we used to test these issues Section 4. Our goal in this paper is not to present a single 
unified theory of vagueness.  Rather,  we believe  our work can help to  refine existing 
theories of vagueness by providing theorists with new data on existing problems. Many 
of these problems are typically solved with armchair methods that, as we now show, do 
not correspond with the empirical data. 
1. A Review of Bonini et al. 
We begin by giving a critical  evaluation of an experiment conducted by Bonini et al.  
(1999), who used empirical methods to test Williamson's epistemicist predictions about 
language  use.  After  outlining  their  experiment  we  identify  several  problems  that 
undermine its conclusion. The first concerns the implementation of their experiment: we 
show that their survey question is both ambiguous and question-begging, and that the 
ambiguity had a significant effect on their findings. We then argue that their experiment 
suffers from methodological problems which undermine its philosophical import.
Bonini et al. (1999) ran seven studies, the first six of which were nearly identical. 
In these first  experiments they divided participants into two groups, truth-judgers and 
falsity-judgers. In the first three studies, truth-judgers were asked
When is it true to say that a man is ‘tall’? Of course, the adjective ‘tall’ is false of  
very small men and true of very big men. We're interested in your view of the 
matter. Please indicate the smallest height that in your opinion makes it true to say 
that a man is ‘tall’. 
5
It is true to say that a man is ‘tall’ if his height is greater than or equal to 
____ centimeters.
Falsity-judgers were asked
When is it false to say that a man is ‘tall’? Of course, the adjective ‘tall’ is false of 
very small men and true of very big men. We're interested in your view of the 
matter. Please indicate the greatest height that in your opinion makes it false to 
say that a man is ‘tall’. 
It is false to say that a man is ‘tall’ if his height is less than or equal to  
____ centimeters.
In each study participants were asked a similar question about up to six different vague 
predicates. Bonini et al. claim that the epistemicist, gap and degree theorist each predict 
that  the  average  estimates  of  truth-judgers  will  be  significantly  larger  than  those  of 
falsity-judgers  (ibid, pp. 379-380). They call these 'gaps' (not to be confused with gap 
theory, or truth gaps) because there is a gap between where truth-judgers stop and where 
falsity-judgers start applying the predicate.  They claim the glut theorist predicts gluts, 
i.e., an overlap between where truth-judgers stop and where falsity-judgers start applying 
the predicate. We describe and evaluate these claims in section 1.2.
Because all six studies yield similar results we focus on data from three predicates 
in  their  second  study,  which  we  call  Bonini-vague.  Their  data  (ibid,  p.  383)  are 
reproduced in table 1. The table shows the mean estimates and standard deviation (SD) of 
each  group.  To test  if  the  differences  between  truth-judgers  and falsity-judgers  were 
greater than those that could be expected by chance alone, Bonini et al. used a Mann-
Whitney U-Test (MW). MW ranks all of the scores from lowest to highest (assigning tied 
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ranks to tied scores), and then sums the ranks for each group. To see if the two groups 
differ, the sum of the ranks for each group is compared with one another,  yielding a 
differences  score.  The  standardized  difference  between  these  groups,  or  z,  is  then 
assessed for significance to determine whether it is likely to have occurred by chance 
alone.  p is an indicator of significance. When  p > 0.05, the observed difference is not 
large enough to allow us to infer that the groups are different, as these differences may be 
due solely to chance;  however,  when  p < 0.05 we can be reasonably certain that the 
observed  differences  are  significant,  and  we  can  use  this  information  to  inform our 
inferences.
Predicate Truth-judgers (N=52) Falsity-judgers (N=56) z-score
'tall' 179.55 cm SD=6.7 164.13 cm SD=14.7 z=7.48 p<.001
'old' 76.59 yr SD=8.7 62.27 yr SD=10.5 z=6.35 p<.001
'long' 165.16 min SD=42.1 121.96 min SD=43.8 z=4.95 p<.001
Table 1: Results from Bonini-vague (Mann Whitney U-Test)
For each question,  the average response of truth-judgers is larger than that of falsity-
judgers. The difference was statistically significant in every case. For example, the data 
show a 14-year gap between where falsity-judgers stopped taking the application of 'old' 
to be false and where truth-judgers started taking it to be true. Bonini et al. take these data 
to  be  consistent  with  three  different  theories  (truth  gaps,  degree  theory,  and 
epistemicism).  However, they argue for an epistemicist interpretation on two grounds. 
The first is familiar  theoretical arguments against gap and degree theory. We will not 
discuss  these  arguments,  though  they  are  evaluated  by  Alxatib  and  Pelletier 
(forthcoming). The second is by means of a seventh study aimed at testing epistemicism 
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directly.  This  study,  which  we  label  Bonini-crisp, tested  the  hypothesis  'S mentally 
represents vague predicates  in the same way as other predicates with sharp true/false 
boundaries of whose location S is uncertain' (ibid, p. 387).
The questions  in  Bonini-crisp were similar  to  those in  Bonini-vague,  but  they 
contained  predicates  that  Bonini  et  al.  claimed  were  both  crisp  and  had  uncertain 
boundaries. This time participants were divided into upper-judgers (mirroring the truth-
judgers  of  Bonini-vague)  and  lower-judgers  (mirroring  the  falsity-judgers).  Upper-
judgers were asked3
When is a man at least of average height among 30-year-old Italians? Of course, a 
man of at least average height among 30-year-old Italians is not too tall and not 
too  short.  We  are  interested  in  your  view  of  the  matter.  Please  indicate  the 
smallest height that in your opinion makes a man of at least average height among 
30-year-old Italians. 
A man is of at least average height among 30-year-old Italians if his height 
is greater than or equal to ____ centimeters.
Similarly, lower-judgers were asked
When is a man not as tall as average among 30-year-old Italians? Of course, a 
man not as tall as average among 30-year-old Italians is not too tall and not too 
short.  We are interested in your view of the matter.  Please indicate the largest 
height that in your opinion makes a man not as tall as average among 30-year-old 
Italians. 
3The questionnaires used by Bonini et al. were given to Italian students (in Italian). Bonini et al. published 
translations of the questions in Bonini-vague, but not of those in Bonini-crisp. Part of the question below 
was translated into English from a copy of the original Italian text sent to us by Daniel Osherson.
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A man is not as tall as average among 30-year-old Italians if his height is 
less than or equal to ____ centimeters.
Participants  were  asked  about  six  different  predicates,  including  “of  average  height 
among 30-year-old Italians”, “of average age for an adult Italian”, and “the average [film 
length] of those shown at the Biannual Venice Film Festival”. The data from  Bonini-
crisp (ibid, p. 391) for three predicates is reproduced in table 2.
Question Upper-judgers (N=42) Lower-judgers (N=43) z-score
average 
height
171.48 cm SD=4.86 150.49 cm SD=32.95 z=5.05 p<.001
average 
age
55.67 yr SD=15.55 35.79 yr SD=15.19 z=5.07 p<.001
average 
length
131.07 min SD=63.78 83.67 min SD=35.83 z=4.05 p<.001
Table 2: Results from Bonini-crisp (Mann Whitney U-Test)
For each question, the average response of upper-judgers is larger than that of lower-
judgers. The difference is statistically significant in every case. For example, the data 
show a 20-year gap between where lower-judgers stopped applying “of average age for 
an adult Italian” and upper-judgers started.
To summarize: Bonini-vague asked participants about vague predicates and found 
a  gap between  the  average  responses  of  truth  and falsity-judgers.  Bonini-crisp asked 
participants  about crisp predicates and found a gap between the average responses of 
upper and lower-judgers. Although this result is incompatible with gluts, Bonini et al. 
acknowledge  that  the  data  can  be  explained  by  at  least  three  different  theories  of 
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vagueness: degree theory, truth gaps and epistemicism. Gap and degree theory are then 
rejected  on  familiar  (e.g.,  see  Williamson  1994)  independent  grounds.  Bonini  et  al. 
conclude that  participants mentally represented the vague predicates in  Bonini-vague as 
they did the crisp predicates in  Bonini-crisp, a result they claim epistemicism can best 
explain. In the following sections we outline several serious problems with Bonini et al.'s 
experiment and the conclusions they draw from it.
1.1 Problem 1: A Question-begging Assumption
Perhaps the most worrisome problem with Bonini et al.'s experiment is a presupposition 
in the question given to respondents. Recall the instruction sentence from Bonini-vague: 
“Please indicate the smallest height that in your opinion makes it true to say that a man is 
‘tall’.” This language was necessary because the hypotheses given by Bonini et al. make 
predictions about the area of application for each predicate and its negation. The problem 
is that the hypotheses, and the questions used to test them, presuppose an epistemicist 
account of vagueness. The question presupposes that there is a precise boundary between 
tall  and  non-tall  men,  viz.  “the  smallest  height”.  Although  this  presupposition  is 
unproblematic  for  epistemicists  and  some truth-gap  theorists,  it  is  incompatible  with 
many  other  theories  of  vagueness.  Moreover,  some  theorists  who  accept  the 
presupposition claim that we ought not to answer such questions. In fact, Williamson's 
own theory of vagueness maintains that participants are unjustified in giving any answer 
to the question posed in his own study; a genuine epistemicist  would remain silent if 
presented with the instruction sentence. It is reasonable to assume that of the participants 
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who did answer, some would have preferred to remain silent.4 Although we do not know 
how this “forced filling-in” affected the data, it is a source of noise that is inherent to the 
design  of  the  experiment.  This  makes  the  design  question-begging.  It  assumes  that 
epistemicism is true, because if epistemicism is not true then the question is nonsense; 
moreover, even if epistemicism is true, there is simply no way for a participant who does 
not believe that vague predicates have precise boundaries to respond. 
1.2 Problem 2: Ambiguous Questions
The conclusions reached by Bonini et al.  are also threatened by an ambiguity in their 
questions.  Consider this part of the 'tall' question put to truth-judgers (emphasis ours):
... Please indicate the smallest height that in your opinion makes it true to say that 
a man is ‘tall’. 
It is true to say that a man is ‘tall’ if his height is greater than or equal to 
____ centimeters.
The instruction sentence asks participants to complete a necessity claim by asking (with a 
superlative) for the smallest height that makes it true to say a man is 'tall'. This is the data  
required  to  test  the  hypotheses  given  by  Bonini  et  al.  But  the  answer  portion  asks 
participants to complete a sufficiency claim by asking (with a comparative) for a number 
n such that it is true to say a man is 'tall' if his height is greater than or equal to n. These 
are different questions. Where the necessity claim challenges participants to give values 
at the outermost boundaries (if they exist), the sufficiency claim allows participants to 
avoid  making  a  contentious  or  uncomfortable  judgment  by giving  a  safer  value.  For 
4In the next section we describe a revised version of this experiment. Some of our participants left the 
questions blank, while others wrote unsolicited comments on the instruments citing the apparent absurdity 
of the question as the reason for their inability or unwillingness to answer.
11
example, suppose Alex believes that the smallest height that makes it true to say a man is  
'tall' is 170 cm. To answer the necessity claim truthfully, Alex must write '170' in the 
answer portion. But the sufficiency claim allows Alex to give any number greater than 
170: after all, it is true to say a man is 'tall' if his height is greater than or equal to 180,  
200 or even 500 centimeters. This ambiguity can be found in all of the questions used by 
Bonini et al. As a result, truth-judgers answering the sufficiency claim may have given 
responses greater than what they believed was the smallest possible value (assuming they 
believed there was such a value), and in particular values greater than those they would 
have  provided  if  presented  only  with  the  necessity  claim.  Similarly,  falsity-judgers 
answering  the  sufficiency  claim  may  have  given  responses  smaller  than  what  they 
believed was the greatest possible value (assuming they believed there was such a value), 
and in particular values smaller than what they would have provided if presented only 
with the necessity claim. Instead of being a genuine feature of vagueness, the observed 
gaps may have been created by the ambiguity in the questions used by Bonini et al.
1.3 Revising Bonini et al.
Our  hypothesis  is  that  the  ambiguity  amplified  the  gaps  found  in  Bonini-vague  and 
Bonini-crisp. To test our hypothesis we created four different studies, each based on a 
version  of  their  question.  The  first  two  are  Replication-vague  and  Replication-crisp. 
Participants in these studies were given English copies of the questions in Bonini-vague 
and Bonini-crisp. Results from the Replication studies were compared with results from 
our  other  two  studies,  Revised-vague  and  Revised-crisp.  Participants  in  the  Revised 
studies  were  only  presented  with  the  necessity  claim;  i.e.,  they  were  given  a 
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disambiguated version of the question. We predict that Replication-vague will have larger 
gaps than Revised-vague, and that Replication-crisp will have larger gaps than Revised-
crisp. 
Participants. 368 undergraduates at the University of Calgary and 345 undergraduates 
at the University of Toronto participated. The experiments were conducted in 2005 and 
2007.
Procedure. Replication-vague contained two control groups, truth-judgersRep  (N=142) 
and falsity-judgersRep (N=141). These groups were given questions identical to those in 
Bonini-vague  (i.e.,  ambiguous questions).  Their  results  were compared to  those from 
Revised-vague,  which  was  composed  of  truth-judgersRev  (N=80)  and  falsity-judgersRev 
(N=78). These groups were given disambiguated questions. For example, truth-judgersRev 
were asked
What is the smallest height a man can be so that he is still tall enough for it to be 
true to say that he is 'tall'? ____ feet and ____ inches.
Similar questions were asked about 'old'  and 'long'.  Falsity-judgersRev were also given 
disambiguated questions.
Replication-crisp also contained two control groups, upper-judgersRep (N=42) and 
lower-judgersRep (N=43). These groups were given questions identical to those in Bonini-
crisp (i.e., ambiguous questions). Their results were compared to those from  Revised-
crisp,  which  was  composed  of  upper-judgersRev (N=90)  and  lower-judgersRev (N=97). 
These groups were given disambiguated questions. For example, upper-judgersRev were 
asked
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What is the smallest height a man can be so that he is still tall enough to be at  
least as tall as the average 30-year-old Canadian? ____ feet and ____ inches.
Similar questions were asked about average age and film length. Lower-judgersRev were 
also given disambiguated questions. 
Results. Table 3 compares data from  Replication-vague with that from  Revised-
vague. Each box compares average responses from a Replication question against those 
from its Revised counterpart. For example, the average 'tall' response of truth-judgersRep is 
182.49cm (SD=5.5), whereas the average response of truth-judgersRev is only 166.88cm 
(SD=19.28). The z-score column shows if there is a significant difference between the 
truth and falsity-judgers in a given row. 
Question Truth-judgersRep (N=142)/ 
truth-judgersRev (N=80) 
Falsity-judgersRep (N=141)/
falsity-judgersRev (N=78)
z-score
tall 182.49 cm/
166.88 cm
SD=5.5/
SD=19.28
177.30 cm/
173.53 cm
SD=9.44/
SD=68.47
z=5.44/
z=2.47
p<.001/
p<.05
old 58.60 yr/
38.71 yr
SD=10.90/
SD=16.15
52.30 yr/
43.65 yr
SD=12.41/
SD=20.97
z=5.10/
z=1.53
p<.001/
N.S.
long 144.47 min/
99.38 min
SD=34.14/
SD=43.66
124.08 min/
106.64 min
SD=39.30/
SD=32.45
z=5.16/
z=0.16
p<.001/
N.S.
Table 3: Testing the ambiguity in Bonini-vague (Mann Whitney U-Test)
The control study Replication-vague yielded results similar to Bonini-vague: we observed 
statistically significant  gaps between truth-judgersRep and falsity-judgersRep  for all  three 
predicates.5 These gaps disappeared in Revised-vague, where there was no significant gap 
5Although our observation of gaps mirrored those in Bonini-vague, the specific values participants gave 
were quite different. For example, the average 'tall' response of falsity- judgersRep was 177.30 cm; it was 
164.13 cm in Bonini-vague. We ignore this difference because Bonini et al. do not take the specific values 
obtained to be relevant to their hypothesis. The difference, if statistically significant, would suggest only 
that Italian students view vague predicates as having different boundaries than their English counterparts, 
not necessarily that they are mentally represented in different ways.
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between  truth-judgersRev and  falsity-judgersRev for  'old'  and  'long',  and  there  was  a 
statistically significant glut for 'tall'. 
Table 4 compares data from Replication-crisp with data from Revised-crisp.
Question Upper-judgersRep (N=42)/ 
upper-judgersRev (N=90)
Lower-judgersRep (N=43)/
lower-judgersRev (N=97)
z-score
average 
height
173.52 cm/
164.9 cm
SD=4.51/
SD=15.47
170.31 cm/
167.67 cm
SD=7.15/
SD=8.79
z=2.62/
z=2.51
p<.01/
p<.05
average 
age
31.76 yr/
33.99 yr
SD=8.47/
SD=11.26
35.24 yr/
41.16 yr
SD=8.36/
SD=15.91
z=1.53/
z=2.87
N.S./
p<.01
average 
length
71.26 min/
77.68 min
SD=31.12/
SD=57.6
67.78 min/
78.25 min
SD=30.89/
SD=36.72
z=0.55/
z=0.67
N.S./
N.S.
Table 4: Testing the ambiguity in Bonini-crisp (Mann Whitney U-Test)
Interestingly, the results of  Replication-crisp  differ greatly from those of  Bonini-crisp.  
Both studies show a significant  gap between upper-judgersRep and lower-judgersRep on 
“average  height”.  But  unlike  Bonini-crisp,  Replication-crisp shows  no  statistically 
significant  difference between upper-judgersRep and lower-judgersRep for “average age” 
and “average length”. Revised-crisp showed statistically significant gluts between upper-
judgersRev and lower-judgersRev for “average height” and “average age”, and no significant 
difference for “average length”.
Discussion. The data from each study are summarized in Table 5. Differences from the 
results of Bonini et al. are in bold. 
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Study 'tall'/average height 'old'/average age 'long'/average length
Bonini-vague Gap Gap Gap
Replication-vague Gap Gap Gap
Revised-vague Glut No sig. difference No sig. difference
Bonini-crisp Gap Gap Gap
Replication-crisp Gap No sig. difference No sig. difference
Revised-crisp Glut Glut No sig. difference
Table 5: Summary of Results
The data strongly support the hypothesis that the ambiguity amplified or created the gaps. 
The gaps found in  Replication-vague  and  Bonini-vague were completely eliminated in 
Revised-vague.6 Revised-crisp  also  eliminated  the  gaps  found in  Bonini-crisp,  though 
comparisons here are made slightly more complicated because the results of Replication-
crisp  did  not  match  those  of  Bonini-crisp.  This  suggests  either  that  something  went 
wrong in at least one study, or that Canadian students mentally represent crisp predicates 
differently  than  their  Italian  counterparts.  Nonetheless,  data  from  these  studies  still 
support our hypothesis. We claimed that the ambiguity in the wording used by Bonini et 
al. made a difference, and it clearly did: the results from Revised-crisp differ from those 
of both Replication-crisp and Bonini-crisp. 
Recall  that Bonini et al.  used the apparently similar gaps in  Bonini-vague  and 
Bonini-crisp  to argue that participants  mentally  represent vague predicates as they do 
crisp ones. Although we found some similarities between  Revised-vague  and  Revised-
crisp,  they  were  not  of  the  kind  epistemicism  predicts.  Revised-vague  showed  a 
6Interestingly, the gaps were eliminated in an unanticipated way. We expected that removing the ambiguity 
would cause truth-judgers to give smaller values and falsity-judgers to give larger values. But both truth 
and falsity-judgers gave smaller values in Revised-vague than they did in Replication-vague. However, 
falsity-judgersRev didn't drop nearly as much as truth-judgersRev, and the difference was enough to turn the 
gaps into gluts. 
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significant glut for 'tall' and no significant difference for 'long'. Similarly,  Revised-crisp 
showed a significant glut for “average height” and no significant difference for “average 
length”.  This  shows  not  only  that  the  ambiguity  affected  the  data,  but  also  that  a 
disambiguated question yields data inconsistent with epistemicism. The hypothesis that 
speakers treat vague and crisp predicates identically is supported by 2 of the 3 predicates, 
but neither shows data that Bonini et al. think the epistemicist would predict. In section 
1.5 we argue that these similarities offer no support for epistemicism.
According to the hypotheses advanced by Bonini et al., our data would provide 
some evidence for a glut theory and tell against epistemicism, gap and degree theory. 
However,  we  are  not  prepared  to  make  this  claim  ourselves.  Although  the  revised 
questions eliminated the ambiguity, the question-begging assumption (see section 1.1) is 
intrinsic  to  the  design  of  the  experiment,  and in  later  sections  we outline  additional 
problems that tell against any meaningful interpretation of data. In our view, our data 
only license the conclusion that the ambiguity created the gaps observed by Bonini et al.; 
we do not  believe  that  data  from this  kind  of  experiment,  revised  or  otherwise,  can 
reliably be used to argue for any theory of vagueness.7
1.4 Problem 3: Inappropriate Statistical Methods
In section 1, we described the hypotheses Bonini et al. give on behalf of the epistemicist, 
gap, glut, and degree theorist. For example, they claim the epistemicist predicts that the 
average estimates of truth-judgers will be significantly larger than those of falsity-judgers 
7Alxatib and Pelletier (forthcoming) also criticize Bonini et al.'s experiment. They reinterpret Bonini et al.'s 
data and argue that it provides partial support for gap theories of vagueness. Although we agree with some 
of their criticisms, we do not believe that Bonini et al.'s data support gap theories. In our view, the problems 
with their methodology and experimental design (described throughout section 1) are simply too great for 
its results to be given any philosophical or psychological import.
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(ibid, pp. 379-380). Although each of their hypotheses is framed in terms of  average 
estimates, the statistical analysis Bonini et al. use, the Mann Whitney U-test (MW), does 
not test for significantly different averages (i.e., means): it tests for significantly different 
medians. Bonini et al. are aware of this: '[MW] was employed to evaluate the hypothesis 
that the medians  of the two groups are identical'  (ibid,  p.  382). In general,  MW is a 
perfectly good test for significance and, in the experiments reported by Bonini et al., it 
does show that the responses of truth-judgers were significantly different from those of 
falsity-judgers. But because MW tests for significance by comparing median values, it 
cannot support a hypothesis about two groups having significantly different means: two 
sets may have similar means but very different medians, e.g., {100, 101, 102} and {1, 2, 
300}. This would be unproblematic if the hypotheses given by Bonini et al.  could be 
reformulated in terms of median values. But their philosophical arguments hinge on truth 
and falsity-judgers having significantly different means. 
The average responses … reveal substantial gaps between the range of values in 
which the target sentence is deemed true, and those for which it is deemed false. 
For example, the range of indeterminacy for ‘old man’ is ten years, which is more 
than 15% of the size of the region in which the predicate  is judged to apply  
falsely. Gaps of similar size show up throughout our studies. (ibid, p. 382)
The statistical significance of the gaps cannot be ascertained from MW because gap size 
is defined by Bonini et al. in terms of mean values: it is calculated by subtracting the 
mean falsity-judger value from the mean truth-judger value. Because Bonini et al. did not 
test  for  significantly  different  means,  we  do  not  know  if  the  relevant  values  are 
significantly different, and thus we cannot know if the observed gap – whose size is a key 
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part of the epistemicist hypothesis – is a reliable observation or merely the product of 
chance. 
One  of  the  most  common  tests  that  is  used  to  compare  mean  differences  is 
Student’s t test, one of a class of parametric tests that use the sample variance within a 
group of participants to estimate the variance of the population as a whole. In order for 
this estimate to be accurate, the variance of the participant group must conform to the 
standard  distribution  (i.e.,  a  Gaussian  distribution).  When  this  assumption  is  met, 
parametric  tests can provide sufficient power to accurately detect  differences between 
means.  Nonparametric  tests  like  MW  make  no  assumptions  about  the  shape  of  the 
distribution. This liberates these tests from assumptions of normality, but does so at the 
cost of specificity. MW tests to see whether two group distributions are different in any 
way, but unless it can be shown that the two group distributions have an equal shape 
(e.g., variance, skew and kurtosis) these differences cannot be attributed to differences 
between the central tendencies of the groups. We ran MW on our data to more closely 
replicate  and revise Bonini et  al.'s  experiment.  However,  we were unable to compare 
these  results  to  those  generated  by  parametric  tests  (i.e.,  tests  that  would  check  for 
statistically significant means) because our data sets had large standard deviations. We 
suspect that Bonini et al. used MW for precisely this reason; their data also has large 
standard  deviations.  What  MW tells  us  (and Bonini  et  al.)  is  that  truth-judgers  gave 
significantly larger answers than falsity-judgers. But the hypotheses given by Bonini et 
al. require more than this; they require a significant difference in average estimates.
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1.5 Types of Errors
Bonini  et  al.  claim that  the  epistemicist,  gap  and degree  theorist  all  predict  that  the 
average  estimates  of  truth-judgers  will  be  significantly  larger  than  those  of  falsity-
judgers.
According to [the epistemicist], subjects react to questions about vague predicates 
as they do to questions about sharp predicates whose boundaries they think they 
do not know. To be more specific, we combine [epistemicism] with the auxiliary 
assumption that in responding to requests for the smallest number of which the 
predicate is true,  S gives the least number for which he is reasonably confident  
that the predicate applies. In responding to requests for the greatest number of  
which the predicate is false, S gives the largest number for which he is reasonably 
confident  that  the  predicate  fails  to  apply.  Using  a  statistical  analogy,  S is  
assumed to prefer type I error over type II. For example, truth-judgers lower the 
chance of accepting the truth of ‘tall’ in a region where it fails to apply by raising 
the  chance  of  failing  to  accept  ‘tall’  where  it  does  apply.  To  explain  the  
preference,  we  may  conceive  false  application  of  a  predicate  as  an  error  of  
commission and incorrect withholding of the predicate as an error of omission.  
There is evidence that people perceive errors of commission as graver than those 
of omission (Ritov and Baron, 1990; Spranca et al., 1991) and this would induce 
reluctance  by  truth-judgers  to  descend  far  down  the  height-continuum,  and  
reluctance by falsity-judgers to ascend too high. Gaps result (ibid, p. 387).
So,  according to  Bonini  et  al.,  the  desire  to  avoid  errors  of  commission  leads  truth-
judgers to give values above the unknowable boundary (since going too low might lead to 
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error) and falsity-judgers to give values below the unknowable boundary (since going too 
high might lead to error). The result is a gap between the responses of truth and falsity-
judgers. Clearly the explanation is consistent with the data.  But what is needed is an 
explanation of why the epistemicist specifically predicts gaps.
It is certainly not clear why the epistemicist could not predict gluts or a lack of 
significant  difference  between  truth  and  falsity-judgers.  For  instance,  the  “average 
length” question in  Replication-crisp  showed a 4-minute gap between upper-judgersRep 
and lower-judgersRep that was not statistically significant. The epistemicist could plausibly 
maintain that the real (unknowable) boundary was somewhere in this area. It is very hard 
to see what the epistemicist gains by requiring that the gap be statistically significant. If 
anything,  statistical  insignificance provides  better  evidence  for  epistemicism  than 
significant gaps: uniform responses between groups shows that truth and falsity-judgers, 
and upper and lower-judgers, stopped somewhere near the same (unknowable) boundary. 
Of  course,  gap  (and  glut)  theorists  could  give  a  similar  explanation  for  statistical 
insignificance: nothing in gap or glut theory requires that the gap (or glut) be statistically 
significant.  
The epistemicist  can also account for gluts.  Even if  people do perceive type I 
errors (error of commission, false positives) as being graver than type II errors (errors of 
omission, false negatives), what the epistemicist needs to show is that speakers actively 
avoid type I errors when using vague language. People make type I errors all the time: 
e.g.,  students  answer  exam  questions  incorrectly  instead  of  leaving  them  blank  and 
drivers  get  in accidents  by going too fast  or  making a  wrong turn.  Facing gluts,  the 
epistemicist  could  plausibly  claim  that  the  application  of  vague  predicates  was  just 
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another circumstance where type II error was prevalent. Gap (glut) theorists could use a 
similar line of reasoning to explain gluts (gaps), since nothing in these theories requires 
that speakers know where the gluts (gaps) are, or that they err in a particular way.
So  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  is  gained  by  this  kind  of  experiment.  Some 
explanations may be better than others but, nonetheless, each possible outcome can be 
plausibly explained by nearly every theory of vagueness. This is precisely why Bonini et 
al.  end  up  giving  ordinary  theoretical  arguments  against  gap  and  degree  theory: 
remember  that  on  their  own  hypotheses,  the  data  is  equally  compatible  with  those 
theories. So it is difficult to see what new information the experiment gave Bonini et al.  
since, apparently, they believe that gap and degree theory can be ruled out on unrelated 
grounds.
1.6 Mental Representation of Vague Predicates
Bonini  et  al.  take  the  gaps  in  Bonini-vague  and  Bonini-crisp  as  evidence  for 
epistemicism.
The  results  support  the  hypothesis  that  estimates  of  an  acknowledged,  but 
unknown, boundary are generated in a manner similar to estimates of true and 
false regions of continua associated with vague predicates. In both cases, people 
seem to focus on regions which have little chance of straddling the dividing line at 
issue.  This  supports  the  conjecture  that  the  psychological  interpretation  of 
vagueness rests on the assumption of a sharp but unknown boundary (ibid, pp. 
391-392).
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Yet this conclusion would follow only if there was a relationship between gap similarity 
and psychological  interpretation.  This need not be the case.  Consider  the predicate  P 
('equal to two plus two') and a blank predicate Q ('average mass of extraterrestrial life').8 
P has acknowledged and known boundaries;  Q may or may not have crisp boundaries, 
but  ordinary  speakers  know  nothing  about  extraterrestrial  life.  Suppose  we  ran  an 
experiment like Bonini-crisp with P and Q. Because both the greatest value for which it is 
false to say a number is P and the smallest value for which it is true to say a number is P 
is 4, there will be no difference between truth and falsity-judgers. Because neither truth 
nor falsity-judgers know the value of Q, their guesses should be statistically identical: a 
truth-judger is no more likely to give any particular number than a falsity-judger. So P 
and  Q will show similarly-sized gaps, i.e., none. Irrespective of whether  P and  Q are 
vague,  it  would  not  follow from this  result  that  P and  Q had  similar  psychological 
interpretations. Presumably, we computed the extension of P and guessed the extension 
of  Q.  Our  worry  is  that  the  gaps  in  Bonini-vague  and  Bonini-crisp  are  an  equally 
uninformative measure.
For the sake of argument, let us now suppose that the gaps are philosophically 
meaningful. It would still not follow that  our mental representation of vague predicates 
assumes a sharp but unknown boundary. The data equally license the conclusion that our 
mental  representation of crisp predicates  assumes  vague boundaries.  At best,  the data 
show  that  we  have  similar  representations  of  vague  and  crisp  predicates.  But  it  is 
question-begging to assume that this  similarity  is a result of their  shared crispness;  it 
might just as easily be a result of their shared vagueness. It is no less plausible to hold 
8A blank predicate is one that speakers know nothing about. This ensures that speaker judgments are 
completely rooted in ignorance. In contrast, it is likely that participants knew some things about the 
(purportedly) blank, crisp predicates Bonini et al. asked about: e.g., they knew that the average Italian was 
not just three feet tall and that the average movie was more than thirty seconds.
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that  the predicates  in  Bonini-crisp  are vague than it  is  to  hold  that  the predicates  in 
Bonini-vague are crisp. Consider the question in Bonini-crisp that asked when a man is of 
at  least  average height  among 30-year-old Italians.  Bonini  et  al.  claim this  is  a crisp 
predicate. And it may be true that if we fixed the meaning of 'average', 'Italian', and '30-
year-old', 'average height among 30-year-old Italians' would be crisp. But this need not be 
the case.
Speakers can use predicates like 'average' vaguely; i.e., without intending to talk 
about a mathematically determined mean. Suppose Robert and Susan are at a dinner party 
in Italy. Robert has just finished reading the latest census and knows that the average 
Italian is 177.75 cm tall. He asks Susan if she has met Marco. She is not sure and asks 
what he looks like.  Robert  replies “He is average height,  for an Italian.”  In this case 
Robert is using “average height” vaguely. Robert may have no idea what a man who is 
specifically 177.75 cm tall looks like, and he is certainly not committing himself to any 
claim about Marco being precisely 177.75 cm tall. He might even know that Marco is 
only 176.15 cm tall. The description given by Robert is perfectly ordinary. For present 
purposes it  does not  matter  how we explain this  phenomenon – it  may be a kind of 
ambiguity,  approximation,  context-sensitivity,  expressive  economy,  or  perhaps  even 
linguistic  incompetence.  Speakers  use  'average  height'  in  these  ways,  and it  is  quite 
possible that some participants in Bonini-crisp did too. These participants would not have 
been mentally representing crisp predicates at all, and so it would not be surprising to 
find similarities in responses to Bonini-crisp and Bonini-vague.
Although  we  do  not  know  how  the  participants  in  Bonini-crisp interpreted 
'average',  the  fact  that  similar  gaps  were  observed  in  Bonini-vague can  be  seen  as 
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evidence that they read it  vaguely. Further evidence can be found in the wording of the 
questions in Bonini-crisp (emphasis ours).
When is a man not as tall as average among 30-year-old Italians? Of course, a 
man not as tall as average among 30-year-old Italians is not too tall and not too 
short. 
This is a parallel version of the questions in Bonini-vague. While this was probably done 
to  minimize  the  differences  between  Bonini-vague and  Bonini-crisp,  it  invites 
participants to read 'average height among 30-year-old Italians' vaguely by characterizing 
'average height' in terms of the vague predicates 'not too tall' and 'not too short'. So it is 
not at all surprising that Bonini et al. get similar results in Bonini-vague and Bonini-crisp, 
since  in  both  cases  participants  are  asked  to  give  a  precise  boundary  to  a  vaguely-
interpreted predicate.
Each of the arguments we gave in this section is, in our view, sufficient to show 
that the experiment done by Bonini et al. is methodologically unsound and that its results 
should not be given any philosophical weight by philosophers of vagueness. However, 
we wholeheartedly agree with the idea that empirical work can meaningfully inform a 
philosophical study of vagueness, provided that the experiments are carefully designed 
from both a philosophical and experimental point of view. In the following sections we 
present data from three of our own experiments.  We have tried to avoid the kinds of 
problems found in Bonini et  al.,  and we make note of areas  where,  in hindsight,  we 
believe improvements could be made.
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2. The Confusion Hypothesis
Many theories of vagueness use a 'definitely' operator. Sometimes the operator is taken in 
a technical  sense.  For example,  the supervaluationist  notion of supertruth is  typically 
explained  in  terms  of  definiteness:  it  is  supertrue  that  x  is  P iff  x  is  P on  every 
precisification of P, which is to say that  x is definitely  P. If 'definitely' is just a special 
operator (e.g.,  one that distinguishes supertruth from truth),  then correspondence with 
natural language may not be important.  But philosophers of vagueness typically want 
more than this: a good theory of vagueness doesn't only solve problems of vagueness, it 
explains  why  we  found  the  problem  so  compelling  in  the  first  place.  For  example, 
because the supervaluationist claims that the law of excluded middle holds in cases of 
vagueness,  a  good supervaluationist  theory will  explain  away the  (typically  untested) 
intuition that ordinary speakers reject instances of it in cases of vagueness. Keefe (2000, 
p. 164) writes:
A statement which is similar to the trivial 'either a is red or not' but which would 
be informative (because sometimes false) is 'either a is definitely red or definitely 
not-red', and it could be that the two are sometimes confused: if someone were to 
assert the former, then, on the assumption that they are obeying the Gricean rule 
of being informative, it would be reasonable to take them to mean the latter. And 
the  fact  that  the  former  is  never informative  could  explain  why  it  is  so
common for our judgments of both sentences to be dictated by our judgments of 
'either a is definitely red or definitely not-red' and why we thus consider 'either a 
is red or not' to be not true.
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Here, Keefe explains away the (purportedly) ordinary intuition that 'either a is red or not' 
is not true by claiming that ordinary speakers confuse it with 'either a is definitely red or 
definitely not-red', which is false on most theories of vagueness. 
Keefe is not the only theorist to defend such a hypothesis, though she is perhaps 
the most well known. Her claim is a version of what is known as a confusion hypothesis. 
Our current interest is in the most general form of the confusion hypothesis, similar to the 
formulation given by Williams (2006, p. 412).
The confusion hypothesis  maintains  that  we confuse an utterance  of 'There is
something that is F' with the claim that there is something that is definitely F: our
intuitions about the former track the truth-values of the latter. The need to explain
the  seductiveness  of  the  sorites  is  incumbent  on  all  non-logically  revisionary
treatments  of vague language;  and the confusion hypothesis  requires only that
one's favoured treatment allow the construction of the notion 'Definitely'. So, for
example,  Greenough  (2003)  defends  an  epistemic  version  of  the  confusion
hypothesis; and Edgington (1997) appeals to the same moves in the context of a
degree theoretic account. Hence, when supervaluationists such as Fine (1975) and
Keefe  (2000)  postulate  confusion  to  explain  the  sorites,  it  is  no  idiosyncratic
idea. 
We take Keefe to be giving a restricted version of the hypothesis that applies only to 
disjunctions that are classical tautologies, and Williams to be giving a generalized non-
tautological existential version. If we can show that confusion occurs in the general case, 
then there will be strong evidence that confusion hypotheses can offer a plausible model 
of the ordinary intuitions that many theorists want to reject. Of course, additional testing 
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will be required to test less general models. Data showing that confusion does not occur 
in the general case will not disprove any more specific model. For example, the restricted 
confusion hypothesis Keefe describes could hold even if confusion does not occur in the 
general case, since speakers might only make the confusion in certain disjunctions. But 
her explanatory burden would be higher, and it would no longer be so easy for a theorist 
to use an untested confusion hypothesis in defense of her particular theory. 
2.1 Experiment #1
We test a generalized version of the confusion hypothesis: speakers use the same truth-
value to describe 'x is φ' and 'x is definitely φ', where 'φ' is a vague predicate.9
Participants. 350  undergraduates  at  the  University  of  Calgary  participated.  The 
experiment was conducted in 2005.
Procedure. Participants  were  divided  into  two  groups:  heavy  (N=176)  was  asked 
about 'heavy' and rich (N=174) was asked about 'rich'. Groups were given paper surveys 
to fill out in a classroom setting. For example, the question for rich read
Imagine  that  on  the  spectrum of  rich  women,  Susan  is  somewhere  between  
women  who  are  clearly  rich  and  women  who  are  clearly  non-rich.10 We  are 
9It would be interesting to see if confusion hypotheses can be iterated.  For example,  one might see if 
speakers use the same truth-value to describe 'x is definitely φ' and 'x is definitely definitely φ', and so on.  
We doubt anyone would claim that  confusion hypotheses  are transitive (e.g.,  that  there is  a confusion  
between 'x is φ' and 'x is definitely definitely definitely definitely definitely φ').
10In retrospect, it would have been better to ask about “the spectrum of richness”, since “the spectrum of 
rich women” could be understood as excluding any women who are clearly non-rich. Fortunately, the 
results do not indicate that participants read the question in this way. If they did, we would expect 
participants to deny that Susan wasn't rich (see questions (6) and (7) in section 4.1). But fewer than 20% of 
respondents answered in this way; more participants said it was true that she was “not rich”. 
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interested in your opinion about the status of the following twelve sentences.11 Please 
check one box only for each.12
[] true [] not true, but also not false [] partially true and partially false
[] false [] both true and false [] true or false, but I don’t know which
Participants were asked to describe the following sentences
(4) Susan is rich.
(5) Susan is definitely13 rich.
Results. We  test  our  hypothesis  by  comparing  the  responses  of  each 
participant to (4) and (5). Table 6 contains data for both heavy and rich, separated by '/'. 
The numbers in the boxes show how many participants answered (4) with the title of the 
row and (5) with the title of the column. For example, 6 participants in  heavy  and 4 in 
rich described both (4) and (5) as neither true nor false.
11Participants were also asked about sentences that were not related to this experiment. Those questions are 
omitted from this list. Some of these additional data are reported in section 4. Originally, (4) was the first 
listed sentence and (5) the ninth.
12Alxatib and Pelletier (forthcoming) worry that giving participants just four choices in an experiment like 
this ('true', 'false', 'other-valued', and 'can't tell') presupposes a degree-theoretic framework because there 
would be no way of knowing how “other-valued” was interpreted; they suggest that participants might 
understand it as 'somewhere in between'. Our experiment has no such ambiguity since participants were 
explicitly allowed to choose between answers corresponding to gap, glut and degree theory.
13Although the terms 'definitely', 'determinately', and 'clearly' are used interchangeably in the literature, we 
chose to ask about 'definitely' because it is most commonly used. Since we asked about 'definitely', we used 
'clearly' in the preamble to avoid extra noise. It would be interesting to see if using 'determinately' or 
'clearly' in the preamble (or asking about 'clearly P' or 'determinately P') would make a difference. 
Moreover, 'definitely' can be used in other ways – e.g., as an epistemic modal. Although we tried to make it 
clear that we were asking about truth, further studies are needed to sort out all of these issues. 
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heavy/rich Answer to (5)
Answer to 
(4)
True Neither Partially False Both Don't know Total
True 5/5 0/1 2/1 10/2 0/1 1/0 18/10
Neither 1/1 6/4 0/1 45/42 1/0 1/2 54/50
Partially 1/1 3/6 4/1 33/20 0/2 4/1 45/31
False 1/0 1/0 0/0 20/47 1/0 0/0 23/47
Both 1/1 1/2 0/2 8/6 3/3 2/1 15/15
Don't know 1/2 2/0 0/0 13/11 0/0 5/8 21/21
Total 10/10 13/13 6/5 129/128 5/6 13/12 176/174
Table 6: Data for heavy and rich
The distribution of responses was statistically significant for both groups (Chi-square, 
p=.000).  The  data  do  not  support  a  generalized  confusion  hypothesis.  Only  24% of 
participants  in  heavy and 39% of those in  rich answered (4) and (5) identically.  The 
difference can mainly be attributed to the fact that a majority (73%) of participants in 
each group described (5) as 'false', while only 13% in heavy and 27% in rich described 
(4) as 'false'. 
2.2 Experiment #2
In this experiment we compare the judgments of ordinary speakers about the boundaries 
of  'φ'  and  'definitely  φ'.  Like  the  questions  in  Bonini  et  al.  (1999),  these  questions 
presuppose that vague predicates have sharp boundaries. However, this presupposition is 
not relevant  to the experiment.  We are not  interested in the specific  values given by 
participants or how they might respond to the presupposition. The generalized confusion 
hypothesis  predicts  that  speakers respond to inquiries  about the boundary of a vague 
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predicate  'φ'  as  they  do to  inquiries  about  that  of  'definitely  φ'.  To test  this  specific 
hypothesis, the question is as good as any.
Participants. 164  undergraduates  at  the  University  of  Calgary  participated.  The 
experiment was conducted in 2005.
Procedure. We used a modified version of  Bonini-vague.  Participants were divided 
into four groups and given paper surveys to fill out in a classroom setting. The group 
largest (N=41) was asked about the largest value n such that 'φ(n)' would not apply; the 
group smallest (N=43) was asked about the smallest value n such that 'φ(n)' would apply.
largest: How tall  could  a  man  be  without  being  considered  'tall'?  The  
largest height a  man  could  be  without,  in  your  opinion,  being  
considered ‘tall’ is ____ feet and ____ inches.
smallest: How short could a man be while still being considered 'tall'? The 
smallest height a man could be while still, in your opinion, being 
considered ‘tall’ is ____ feet and ____ inches.
Responses from largest and smallest were compared with those from participants asked 
about  'definitely φ'. The group  def-largest  (N=39) was asked about the largest value  n 
such that  'definitely  φ(n)'  would apply and the group  def-smallest  (N=41) was asked 
about the smallest value n such that 'definitely φ(n)' would not apply. 
def-largest: How tall could a man be without being considered 'definitely tall'? 
The largest height a man could be without, in your opinion, being 
considered ‘definitely tall’ is ____ feet and ____ inches.
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def-smallest: How short could a man be while still being considered 'definitely 
tall'?  The  smallest  height  a  man  could  be  while  still,  in  your  
opinion, being considered ‘definitely tall’ is __ feet and __  inches.
Each group was asked about 'tall', 'old', and 'long'.
Results. By comparing data from  largest  against  def-largest and  smallest  against 
def-smallest,  we  obtain  six  measures  (each  pair  of  groups  has  three  predicates  to 
compare). The confusion hypothesis holds that speakers confuse 'φ' with 'definitely φ', so 
it predicts no significant difference for any of the six measures: participants in largest and 
def-largest,  and  smallest  and  def-smallest,  should  have  interpreted  their  question 
identically.  In  contrast,  a  significant  difference  would  suggest  that  speakers  did 
distinguish between 'φ' and 'definitely φ'. Table 7 shows the raw data for all groups. We 
use a one-way ANOVA to test for significance. 
Predicate def-largest/
def-smallest
largest/
smallest
def-largest v. largest/
def-smallest v. smallest
'tall' 181.71 cm/
184.55 cm
SD=4.84/
SD=11.39
176.19 cm/
183.12 cm
SD=9.22/
SD=22.93
z=11.06/
z=0.13
<.005/
N.S.
'old' 52.32 yr/
60.73 yr
SD=15.07/
SD=16.07
44.93 yr/
53.84 yr
SD=10.97/
SD=18.86
z=6.27/
z=3.24
p<.05/
N.S.
'long' 128.58 min/
162.83 min
SD=38.20/
SD=129.87
120.49 min/
132.09 min
SD=32.09/
SD=67.97
z=1.06/
z=1.87
N.S./
N.S.
Table 7: Data for Experiment #2
We set aside data from the 'long' comparison between def-smallest and smallest since the 
standard deviation is too big for the ANOVA to be a useful measure of significance. Of 
32
the remaining five measures, only two show a significant difference: 'old' and 'long' in 
def-largest and largest. The remaining three show no significant difference.
2.3 Discussion
Neither of our experiments support a generalized version of the confusion hypothesis, 
which predicts confusion in all six cases. Although Experiment #1 showed that speakers 
distinguished between (4) and (5), one might worry that any confusion between (4) and 
(5)  was  neutralized  by  their  apparent  juxtaposition  on  the  survey  instrument:  each 
participant was asked about both 'φ' and 'definitely φ'. This worry can be set aside by 
considering Experiment #2, where participants were asked for the boundaries for either 
'φ'  or 'definitely  φ'.  Here,  we  found  that  in  three  out  of  five  pairs  speakers  gave 
statistically identical boundaries to 'φ' and 'definitely φ'. That this did not occur in the 
remaining  two  cases  suggests  that  the  confusion  hypothesis  is  not  generalizable. 
Moreover, we cannot be certain that confusion is responsible for the lack of significance 
in the three comparisons where no difference was found, since it is possible that 'φ' and 
'definitely φ' sometimes share a boundary. Nonetheless, the data do show that confusion 
occurs in at least some cases. This leaves open many possibilities. For example, these 
data do not tell against restricted versions of the hypothesis (e.g., Keefe's, see section 4). 
Further  empirical  research  will  be  required  to  more  precisely  characterize  the 
phenomenon. 
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3. Fuzzy Logic and the Inductive Premise of the Sorites
Degree theorists typically hold that notions of fuzziness and partial truth are rooted in 
common sense. This is especially true in computer science14; philosophical accounts are 
more tempered.  For example,  Machina claims that  his  'inclinations  [about  degrees  of 
truth]  are  at  least  verbally  in  agreement  with  the  common  sense  view,'  though  he 
recognizes 'that agreement cannot be taken at face value as an indication that the common 
man thinks of degrees of truth in the same way' (Machina 1976, p. 54). Arguments like 
this give fuzzy logic much to prove in the empirical arena. 
The  inductive  premise  of  the  Sorites  argument  is  typically  expressed  as  a 
conditional, e.g., 
S→ If a is tall, then a' is tall. 
In classical logic, S→ is equivalent to both
S  ˄ It is not the case both that a is tall and a' is not, and
S˅ Either a is not tall or a' is.
This equivalence does not hold in fuzzy logic, where S  is equivalent to ˄ S˅ but not S→.15 
In every Sorites series S→ will always have a truth-value near 1, while the truth values of 
S˄ and S˅ will go as low as 0.5. The degree theorist holds that the Sorites fails because the 
inductive premise is not completely true; it looks persuasive because we 'confuse truth for 
14Perhaps this is why degree theory is the only theory of vagueness that has been put to use. For over three 
decades fuzzy logic has been used in computer science applications to model vagueness (e.g., see Langari 
et al. (eds.), 1995), albeit at varying levels of complexity and to varying degrees of success. Elkan (1994) 
concluded that the fuzzy logic component of such systems had no role in their successes. Although his 
arguments were largely debunked (see the responses accompanying his paper, and Serchuk 2008), his 
general conclusions are still well-regarded in mainstream AI.
15The standard definitions for fuzzy operators are:
t(P ˅ Q) = max(t(P), t(Q))
t(P ˄ Q) = min(t(P), t(Q))
t(P→ Q) = min(1, 1 – t(P) + t(Q))
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near-truth' (Weatherson 2005, p. 61). As Edgington (2001, p. 375) puts it, 'the difference 
between clear truth and almost clear truth – between 1 and 0.99 – is an insignificant 
difference upon which, normally, nothing hangs.' 
Weatherson (2005) holds that the degree theorist cannot explain the plausibility of 
each form of the inductive premise of the Sorites. He argues that even if fuzzy logic 
plausibly models S→, it does not give a plausible account of S˄ and S˅. On his view, the 
degree theorist cannot claim that we confuse truth for near-truth when confronted with S˄ 
and  S˅, since their truth-values are much lower than those of  S→.  Weatherson gives a 
thought experiment in  support  of this  thesis.  His goal is  to  show that  S˄ is  the most 
plausible  version of  the inductive premise,  followed by  S→ and  S˅.  This  is  a  strong 
argument against the degree theorist, for her explanation of the Sorites depends on there 
being a (rough) correlation between degrees of truth and plausibility. 
[The  fuzzy  logician]  has  no  explanation  for  why  premises  like  S˄ look  
persuasive. This is quite bad, because S˄ is more plausible than S→, as I’ll now 
show. Consider the following thought experiment. You are trying to get a group of 
(typically non-responsive) undergraduates to appreciate the force of the Sorites  
paradox. If they don’t feel the force of S→, how do you persuade them? My first 
instinct  is  to  appeal  to  something  like  S˄.  If  that  doesn’t  work,  I  appeal  to  
theoretical  considerations  about  how our  use of  tall couldn’t  possibly pick  a  
boundary  between  a and  a’.  I  think  I  find  S→ plausible  because I  find  S˄ 
plausible,  and  I  would  try  to  get  the  students  to  feel  likewise.  There’s  an  
asymmetry here.  I  wouldn’t  defend  S˄ by appealing to  S→,  and I  don’t  find  
S˄ plausible  because  it  follows  from  S→ …  I  don’t  think  anyone  has  put  
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forward a Sorites argument, where the major premises are like  S˅ … There’s a  
good reason for this:  S˅ is  not intuitively true, unless perhaps one sees it as a  
roundabout way of saying S˄. In this respect it conflicts quite sharply with S˄,  
which is intuitively true (ibid, pp. 61-63).
The result of Weatherson's thought experiment is not obvious.16 
3.1 The Experiment
We devised an empirical test of a version of Weatherson's thought experiment. We tested 
the claim that S˄ is more persuasive than S→, and that S˄ is more persuasive than S˅.
Participants. 243  undergraduates  at  the  University  of  Calgary  participated.  The 
experiments were conducted in 2005. 
Procedure. Participants were divided into two groups. The group heap (N=119) was 
asked about 'heap' and rich' (N=124) about 'rich'. Groups were given paper surveys to fill 
out in a classroom setting. The question given to participants in heap read:
'Heap'  is  a  vague  concept:  it  seems that  our  use  of  the  word  'heap'  does  not 
determine a number  X so that any collection of  X grains of sand or more are a 
heap, and anything with fewer than X grains of sand is not a heap (such a number 
X would be a 'borderline'). Consider the following sentences, where X stands for 
an  arbitrary  number.  We'd  like  to  know  which,  in  your  opinion,  express  the 
vagueness of 'heap' most persuasively and which ones the least. Please rank them 
in order of persuasiveness on the table below. Please break ties.
16For example, Machina (1976) claimed it was a point in favour of fuzzy logic that it gave S→ a greater 
degree of truth than S˄.
[The conjunctive form of the inductive premise for 'bald'] essentially says that it never  happens  
that of two persons differing by just a hair that it can be said that one is bald and the other isn't. 
Since [in fuzzy logic] it can be somewhat true as well as somewhat false that  one individual is  
bald, when his hair is very sparse, it can naturally also be quite true that two individuals, roughly 
alike, are both bald to some extent and not bald to some extent. Hence, the low truth value of [the 
conjunctive form] which denies this can happen (ibid, pp. 200-201).
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(A) If X grains of sand are a heap, then X -1 grains of sand are also a heap. 
(B) The following statement is false: X grains of sand are a heap, but X-1 
grains of sand are not a heap.
(C) X grains of sand does not mark the borderline between being a heap 
and not being a heap.
(D) Either X grains of sand are not a heap or X-1 grains of sand are a heap.
Option (A) corresponds to S→, (B) to S˄, (C) to theoretical considerations (TC), and (D) 
to S˅. This does not precisely match the setting of Weatherson's thought experiment. We 
decided it would be too difficult to give paper surveys to non-philosophers explaining the 
Sorites and its prerequisite logical concepts. So we instead asked participants to decide 
how  persuasively  the  different  formulations  of  the  inductive  premise  expressed  the 
phenomenon of vagueness as described in ordinary English. We believe this sufficiently 
captures the spirit of Weatherson's thought experiment. 
Results. We refer to collapsed data (N=243) since no significant  difference was 
found between the responses of participants in heap and rich'. We test the hypotheses in 
two ways. First, we consider the mean ranking of the answers. This is shown in table 8.
Option Mean SD
TC 1.840 1.054
S→ 2.247 0.960
S˄ 2.679 0.960
S˅ 3.235 0.995
Table 8: Mean Rankings (N=243)
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The mean for each answer corresponds with its average placement in an ordering, with 1 
denoting the first ranking slot (most persuasive) and 4 the fourth (least persuasive). For 
example, if answer A had a mean of 1.000 it would mean that every participant ranked it 
as most persuasive. If A had a mean of 2.500, it would mean that, on average, equally 
many participants ranked it second and third (or first and fourth). We found statistically 
significant differences (p = .000, paired sample T-test) in the mean rankings of every 
possible sentence pair; i.e., the mean ordering of the sentences is statistically significant 
for all possible pairs. The data support the hypothesis that S˄ is more persuasive than S˅ 
(since 2.679 < 3.235) but not S→ (since 2.679 > 2.247).
We can also test  the hypotheses by measuring the relative plausibility of each 
answer pair. This is done in table 9.
Row was ranked as more 
persuasive than column
TC S→ S˄ S˅
TC - 158 (65.0%) 175 (72.0%) 192 (79.0%)
S→ 85 (35.0%) - 153 (63.0%) 188 (77.4%)
S˄ 68 (28.0%) 90 (37.0%) - 163 (67.1%)
S˅ 51 (21.0%) 55 (22.6%) 80 (32.9%) -
Table 9: Relative Plausibility (N=243)
Each box in the table  shows the number and percent  of  participants  who ranked the 
option corresponding to the row as being more persuasive than the option corresponding 
to the column. For example, 158 participants ranked TC as being more persuasive than 
S→. As before, the data support the hypothesis that S˄ is more persuasive than S˅ but not 
38
S→. 67.1% of participants thought S˄ was more persuasive than S˅, but only 37% thought 
S˄ was more persuasive than S→.
Discussion. The data  show that  Weatherson's  thought  experiment  (or,  at  least,  our 
version  of  it)  fails  to  capture  the  intuitions  of  ordinary  speakers  about  the  Sorites. 
Although fuzzy logic plausibly models  S→ as having a greater degree of truth than S˄, 
Weatherson  is  right  that  the  equivalence  between  S˄ and  S˅ is  counterintuitive. 
Importantly,  any  logic  with  DeMorgan's  law  cannot  'tell  a  story  about  why  [S˄]  is 
intuitively  plausible  that  does  not  falsely  predict  [S˅]  is  [too]'  (ibid,  p.  63).  While 
Weatherson might be right that this is a general problem for logics with DeMorgan's law, 
it is particularly damaging for fuzzy logic. Part of what is supposed to make fuzzy logic 
appealing  is  its  (apparent)  correspondence  with  pre-theoretic  ways  of  thinking  about 
vagueness. The data suggest that this is not always the case.
It could be suggested that participants were influenced by the awkwardness of 
some sentences, particularly the conjunction (B) and disjunction (D). The worry here is 
that speakers ranked the sentences not according to the relevant semantic criteria, but 
according to what sounded more natural or was easier to understand. We grant that some 
sentences are less ordinary and natural than others, and we acknowledge that speakers 
may have ranked sentences in this way – we did not ask participants to explain their  
ordering.  But  this  is  no  threat  to  our  conclusion.  Weatherson's  thought  experiment 
involves explaining the Sorites to untutored undergraduates using the unexplained notion 
of 'intuitive truth'. It seems to us that the awkwardness of the disjunction is precisely why 
an  untutored  undergraduate  would  not  find  it  persuasive.  Of  course  the  disjunction 
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becomes compelling once you understand its (classical) semantic features; Weatherson 
recognizes that it becomes 'intuitively true' once one comes to see 'it as a roundabout way 
of saying S˄' (p. 63). What is interesting is whether it is intuitively true beforehand, and in 
such a case criteria like naturalness are perfectly appropriate. 
The degree theorist is not without options. She might grant that persuasiveness is 
a  valid  criterion,  but  maintain  that  our  experiment  did  not  test  the  most  natural 
candidates. For example, perhaps speakers would find a negated conjunction of the form 
“it does not happen that” more compelling than the “the following statement is false” 
form  we  tested.  Additional  empirical  work  would  be  needed  to  evaluate  the  many 
different  possibilities.  The degree theorist  could  also deny that  S˅ is  a  valid  form of 
Sorites reasoning, though she would probably have to reject DeMorgan's law too. An 
option here is to use  Łukasiewicz strong conjunction, where t(P & Q) = max(0, t(P) + 
t(Q) - 1). This ensures  S˄ is given a higher truth-value than  S˅, but at the expense of 
giving S˄ an identical truth-value to S→.17 The best option available to the degree theorist 
is probably to just bite the bullet and admit that her treatment of  S˅ is implausible, but 
maintain  that  this  is  an  acceptable  price  for  a  plausible  model  of  S→ and  S˄.  As 
Weatherson  observes,  nobody  has  'put  forward  a  Sorites  argument  where  the  major 
premises are like  S˅'  (ibid,  p. 63). No doubt this is because sentences like  S˅ are too 
awkward for ordinary use. This suggests that while fuzzy logic may not be the right logic 
of vagueness, it might be close enough for some purposes (e.g., as a heuristic).
17MacFarlane (2010) rejects this move on independent grounds. Mirroring Machina's argument (see n. 16), 
he gives the example of Borderline Jim. Jim is borderline in multiple categories, e.g., baldness, tallness, 
intelligence, etc. Let P denote 'Jim is bald' and Q denote 'Jim is tall', where t(P)=0.5 and t(Q)=0.5. Then the 
strong conjunction of P and Q will be completely false, since t(P & Q) = 0. MacFarlane, citing Schiffer 
(2003), rightly observes that 'it seems perfectly appropriate to endorse the conjunctive proposition that Jim 
is tall and bald ... to about the same (middling) degree as we endorse the conjuncts separately' (p. 13). This 
is the result given by normal fuzzy conjunction, where t(P ˄ Q) = 0.5.
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4. Types of Negation
We will  assume that  however  negation  works  in  borderline  cases,  the  negation  of  a 
proposition  P is clearly (i.e., not borderline) true when P is clearly false, and is clearly 
false when P is clearly true. This leaves open the status of negation in borderline cases. 
Horgan (1994, p. 165) proposes that we distinguish between strong and weak negation.
We want statements like [the inductive premise of the Sorites] to turn out neither 
true nor false ... it is natural and useful to enrich the object language ... by adding 
another form of negation. Let ⌐Φ be true when it's not the case that Φ is true; Φ 
itself might be false, or might lack truth value altogether. Call this weak negation. 
Strong negation18, by contrast, will work in the manner of negation in classical  
logic: ~Φ will be true when Φ is false ... Although these two forms of negation do 
not  seem  to  have  cleanly  distinguishable  modes  of  expression  in  ordinary  
language, I do think they both occur in ordinary language. So I now stipulate the 
following usage, to apply henceforth in this paper: 'it's not the case that' is to be 
understood as the ordinary-language counterpart of  ⌐, whereas other negation  
constructions in English will be counterparts of ~.
Horgan uses this framework to model the inductive premise of the Sorites. On his view, 
neither the inductive premise nor its strong negation is either true or false; their weak 
negations  are  therefore true.19 A third candidate (not considered by Horgan) is  Gödel 
18Strong negation is also known as Kleene negation. See Kleene 1952.
19For example, Horgan claims that both the inductive premise “For any n, if an n-haired person is bald then 
an (n+1)-haired person is bald” and its strong negation are neither true nor false. Thus their weak 
negations, “It's not the case that for any n, if an n-haired person is bald then an (n+1)-haired person is bald” 
and “It's not the case that not every n is such that if an n-haired person is bald then an (n+1)-haired person 
is bald” are true (Horgan, p. 165).
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(intuitionistic) negation, ~gP:  ~gP is clearly true iff P is clearly false, and false otherwise. 
The three options are summarized in Table 10.
P Strong (~P) Weak (⌐P) Gödel (~gP)
True False False False
Other Other True False
False True True True
Table 10: Truth Tables for Three Kinds of Negation
Suppose Bill is borderline tall such that (on a given theory of vagueness)  T(b) 
(i.e., Bill is tall) is neither true nor false. Then the strong negation ~T(b) (i.e., Bill is not 
tall) will also be something other than true or false, the weak negation ⌐T(b) (i.e., It is not 
the case that Bill is tall) will be true, and the Gödel negation ~gT(b) will be false. There is 
no proposed linguistic form for  Gödel negation. Obviously there are real technical and 
syntactic  differences  between  these  negations.  Not  only  do  they  have  different  truth 
conditions,  but  their  syntactic  forms  vary.  Weak negation  negates  an entire  sentence, 
whereas strong negation negates only the predicate. We devised an experiment to see if 
there is a corresponding semantic difference in ordinary language.
4.1 The Experiment
The first  experiment  tests  the  hypothesis  that  speakers  treat  negation  in  at  least  two 
different  ways.  The hypothesis  would be supported if  speakers assign different  truth-
values to 'not φ' and 'it is not the case that φ'. We also want to see if  strong negation is 
typically expressed by 'not' and weak negation by 'it is not the case that'. 
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Participants. 350  undergraduates  at  the  University  of  Calgary  participated.  The 
experiments were conducted in 2005.
Procedure. See section 2.1 for an explanation of the preamble and answer set. We re-
used groups heavy (N=176) and rich (N=174). In this experiment, participants were asked 
about the truth of the following six sentences.20
(6) Susan is not rich.
(7) It is not the case that Susan is rich.
(8) Either Susan is rich or Susan is not rich.
(9) Susan is rich or it is not the case that Susan is rich.
(10) Susan is rich and Susan is not rich.
(11) Susan is rich and it is not the case that Susan is rich.21
Although we use Horgan's 'it is not the case that' to express weak negation in ordinary 
language, Horgan is only committed to the existence of weak negation, not to its having a 
particular linguistic form in ordinary language.
Results. We test the hypothesis by comparing the responses of each participant to 
pairs (6) and (7), (8) and (9), and (10) and (11).  Table 11 shows responses from heavy 
and rich.
20Participants were also asked about sentences that were not related to this experiment. Those questions are 
omitted from this list. Some of these additional data are reported in section 2. Sentences (6)-(11) were 
presented in a different order.
21Although our focus is on negation, this is one of the first attempts to empirically test ordinary intuitions 
about the law of excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction.
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heavy/rich Answer to (7)
Answer to 
(6)
True Neither Partially False Both Don't know Total
True 11/29 0/1 0/1 6/4 0/1 1/1 18/37
Neither 20/14 18/16 5/2 5/4 1/1 5/6 54/43
Partially 14/10 6/8 12/10 11/2 1/0 5/3 49/33
False 4/16 0/1 3/0 14/9 0/1 3/0 24/27
Both 1/3 1/1 0/1 3/3 4/4 3/1 12/13
Don't know 2/2 1/3 0/0 2/2 0/1 14/13 19/21
Total 52/74 26/30 20/14 41/24 6/8 31/24 176/174
Table 11: Responses to (6) and (7), N=176/174
The data support our hypothesis:  59% of participants in  heavy  and 53% in  rich gave 
different answers to (6) and (7).22 Some theorists hold that (6), a case of strong negation, 
is something other than 'true' or 'false'. This leaves open the question of what the strong 
negation  of  such  sentences  is.  We  captured  this  by  allowing  participants  to  choose 
between 'partially', 'both', and 'neither'.23 65% of participants in  heavy  and 51% in  rich 
answered (6) as predicted, i.e.,  with one of the four values other than 'true'  or 'false'. 
Some theorists also hold that (7), a weak negation, is true. Yet only 29% of  heavy  and 
43% of  rich  described (7)  as  'true'.  Neither  form is  a  plausible  candidate  for  Gödel 
negation, where 'false' is the predicted result.
22The number of participants who gave different answers to a given pair is the minimum number of 
participants who are guaranteed to have distinguished between members of that pair. Some respondents 
who described each member identically may have distinguished between the two forms of negation, but 
thought they had identical truth-values. 
23Because of the brevity of an early abstract that they accessed, Alxatib and Pelletier (forthcoming) 
mistakenly claim that we only gave subjects three or four options (ibid, p. 9). This leads them to (wrongly) 
conclude that we cannot tell what kind of negation participants were using. In fact, we gave participants six 
options (see section 2.1) precisely so we could tell what kind of negation they were using. Participants 
using strong negation would have chosen 'false', participants using weak negation would have chosen 
'both', 'neither', or 'partially', and participants who (as Alxatib and Pelletier worry) wanted to '[advert] not 
being able to tell' (p. 9) would have chosen 'don't know'. 
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Table 12 shows responses to (8) and (9). We now report collapsed data (N=350) 
since  there  is  no  significant  difference  between  the  responses  of  heavy and  rich to 
questions (8)-(11).
Answer to (9)
Answer to 
(8)
True Neither Partially False Both Don't know Total
True 67 3 5 17 6 15 113
Neither 7 12 2 7 2 4 34
Partially 12 3 4 5 6 5 35
False 41 14 12 56 7 7 137
Both 7 4 2 3 2 1 19
Don't know 7 0 0 0 1 4 12
Total 141 36 25 88 24 36 350
Table 12: Data for (8) and (9), N=350
The data support our hypothesis: 59% of participants gave different answers to (8) and 
(9). Some theorists claim that (8) is something other than 'true' or 'false', since neither 
disjunct  is  true  or  false.  Speakers  did  not  interpret  (8)  in  this  way:  only  29%  of 
participants gave such a response. Although one might expect that speakers think (8) is 
true, most did not describe it as such. In fact, a plurality (39%) of respondents described 
(8) as 'false'. This is a strange result, particularly because only a handful of respondents 
described either of (8)'s disjuncts as 'false'  (see Table 6 and Table 11). However,  this 
result  is  consistent  with  Keefe's  restricted  confusion  hypothesis  (see  section  2).  She 
predicts  that  speakers  will  think  (8)  is  'not  true'  (Keefe  2000,  p.  164)  because  they 
confuse 'Fa or ~Fa' with 'definitely Fa or definitely ~Fa'. Her claim is partially supported 
by our data, which show that 68% of participants described (8) as something other than 
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'true'. Most theorists claim that (9) is true, since one of its disjuncts is. This only partially 
accords with use: a plurality (40%) of respondents described (9) as 'true'. This suggests 
that weak negation is less susceptible than strong negation to Keefe's restricted confusion 
hypothesis, though because we did not ask about 'definitely Fa or definitely ~Fa' there is 
insufficient evidence to know if it holds at all.
Table 13 shows responses to (10) and (11). 
Answer to (11)
Answer to 
(10)
True Neither Partially False Both Don't know Total
True 13 1 10 33 0 9 66
Neither 2 9 0 10 5 2 28
Partially 1 2 3 18 3 3 30
False 4 6 1 173 2 9 195
Both 2 1 3 10 3 2 21
Don't know 3 0 0 3 0 4 10
Total 25 19 17 247 13 29 350
Table 13: Data for (10) and (11), N=350
Because (10) and (11) have the same-truth value (something other than true or false), our 
hypothesis must change: we would not expect (10) and (11) to be described differently. 
And indeed they are not:  59% of participants answered (10) and (11) identically.  An 
answer other than 'true' or 'false' was only given by 22% of respondents to (10) and 14% 
to (11). The data are consistent with Gödel negation, where 'false' is the predicted result: 
this response was given by 56% of respondents to (10) and 71% to (11). Surprisingly, 
speakers were more likely to describe the classical contradiction as 'false' when it was 
generated with a weak negation. This seems to contradict our earlier finding that strong 
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negation was more susceptible to confusion, since if a similar confusion occurred here we 
would expect more participants to describe (10) as 'false'.
4.2 Discussion. The  experiment  supports  the  notion  that  there  are  at  least  two 
forms of  negation  in  natural  language.  But  speakers  did  not  always  use  negation  as 
predicted. Speakers who distinguished between 'not' and 'it is not the case that' did not 
always treat 'not' as a strong negation and 'it is not the case that' as a weak negation. 
Neither form was consistently read as a Gödel negation. This suggests that the standard 
semantic treatments of negation do not consistently correspond with our ordinary use of 
negation  in  borderline  cases.  This  offers  tentative  support  to  the  view  advanced  by 
Alxatib  and  Pelletier  (forthcoming).  Instead  of  holding  that  different  negations 
correspond to different linguistic forms, they argue that a sentence like 
'a is not tall' is actually three-ways ambiguous: on one reading, the negation is  
identified with [strong] negation ... on a second reading 'not' is identified with  
[weak] negation ... and on a third reading 'not' is identified with intuitionistic  
[Gödel] negation. (ibid, p. 25)
On this view, the inconsistency in use that we observed could be explained by appealing 
to an ambiguity in the linguistic forms of negation. 
Data from (8)  and (9)  suggest  that  speakers  are  willing  to  violate  the  law of 
excluded middle in borderline cases. Responses to (10) and (11) show that they tend to 
preserve the law of non-contradiction. These results differ greatly from those found by 
Alxatib  and Pelletier  (forthcoming).  When presented with an image of borderline tall 
man, over 44% of their respondents described him as 'tall and not tall' (ibid, p. 26). In 
47
contrast, our 'both' option was selected by only 19% of respondents to (10) and by 7% of 
respondents to (11). Unfortunately, Alxatib and Pelletier report very little statistical data 
and, in particular, they do not show that the data cited above is statistically significant; 
nevertheless,  the  difference  is  quite  striking.24 Moreover,  there  are  some  important 
differences between our experimental design and theirs. For example, our borderline case 
is linguistically stipulated, whereas theirs is shown visually. So contextual details seem to 
play  a  major  role  in  how  plausible  contradictions  are  to  ordinary  speakers.  Further 
research should be conducted to better understand this phenomenon.25
There is an important connection between these experiments and those in section 
2. The version of the confusion hypothesis that one subscribes to, and the interaction it 
predicts between negation and 'definitely', will determine how one reads our results. For 
example, consider the result that participants were more likely to think (7) was true than 
they were to think that (6) was. This could be explained by a confusion hypothesis if 
participants confused (7) with the much weaker claim “it is not the case that Susan is 
definitely rich”. On the other hand, there doesn't seem to be any evidence of confusion in 
(6): if participants read (6) as “Susan is not definitely rich” we'd expect to see lots of 'true' 
responses (which we didn't),  and if they read it as “Susan is definitely not rich” we'd 
expect  to  see  lots  of  'false'  (which  we didn't).  The  interaction  between negation  and 
confusion  hypotheses  is  complex,  and  more  focused  testing  is  required  before  any 
conclusions about it can be generated from these data.
24Alxatib and Pelletier (ibid, p. 22, n. 14) report one statistical measure for one question and one pair of 
answers. No statistical data is provided for any of the other measures. 
25See Ripley (2009) for unpublished experimental data on the responses of ordinary speakers to 
contradictions in borderline cases.
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5. Conclusion
It was once the standard view that philosophical theories should be evaluated on the basis 
of conceptual  analysis  alone.  Although this  view has been tempered,  there is  still  no 
consensus  concerning  the  role  of  empirical  data  in  the  construction  of  philosophical 
theories. Although we did not set out to justify the use of empirical data by philosophers, 
we believe that our results show the value of considering these data when developing and 
defending theories of vagueness. We have seen how claims about what is intuitive can so 
easily be wrong, and there is no reason to think that such mistakes are rare; we could, no 
doubt,  find  suspect  claims  throughout  the  literature.  Moreover,  it  is  quite  clear  that 
philosophers of vagueness are interested in theories that have at least some bearing on 
ordinary language. Priest writes:
The meanings of vague predicates are not determined by some omniscient being 
in some logically perfect way. Vague predicates are part of  our language. As a  
result, their meanings must answer in the last instance to the use that we make of 
them (Priest 2004, p. 13).
Of course, it does not follow from this that empirical work, let alone experiments and 
paper surveys, are the best way of learning about our language. We must work harder to 
ensure that our experiments are rigorously designed and statistically sound. In section 1 
we showed how an empirical project can fail to be philosophically relevant when these 
conditions  are  not  met.  The  data  presented  by  Alxatib  and  Pelletier  are  genuinely 
interesting,  but  because they do not  test  for  statistical  significance we simply cannot 
know if they are philosophically viable: scientists, psychologists and statisticians have 
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known  for  a  very  long  time  that  it  is  not  enough  simply  to  discover  that  x%  of 
participants do some particular thing. One of our referees commented that 'experimental 
philosophy is no longer in need of a basic defense'. This may be true, but philosophers 
who run experiments (including ourselves) clearly have a lot to learn. Nevertheless, in 
sections 2, 3 and 4, we showed that empirical linguistic data has an important role to play 
in the development of philosophical theories of vagueness. This is especially true when 
theorists make claims about the beliefs and practices of ordinary speakers. And given the 
current state of empirical work in the field – namely, the almost complete lack of it – we 
think that this methodology and our results offer an innovative and underused way of 
thinking about problems of vagueness.
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